Voluntary Commitments Lead to Efficiency by Adam Tauman Kalai et al.
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Abstract. Real world players often increase their payo⁄s by voluntarily com-
mitting to play a ￿xed strategy, prior to the start of a strategic game. In fact,
the players may further bene￿t from commitments that are conditional on the
commitments of others.
This paper proposes a model of conditional commitments that uni￿es earlier
models while avoiding circularities that often arise in such models.
A commitment folk theorem shows that the potential of voluntary con-
ditional commitments is essentially unlimited. All feasible and individually-
rational payo⁄s of a two-person strategic game can be attained at the equilib-
ria of one (universal) commitment game that uses simple commitment devices.
The commitments are voluntary in the sense that each player maintains the
option of playing the game without commitment, as originally de￿ned.
1. Introduction
1.1. The non-cooperative approach to cooperation. In their monumental
book, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) introduced both cooperative and non-
cooperative approaches to games. In two-person zero-sum games, there is no con￿ ict
between the approaches, since the non-cooperative solutions of these are e¢ cient,
i.e., they cannot be mutually improved upon even if the two players cooperate.
However, for general games von Neumann and Morgenstern chose a cooperative
approach, assuming that the players will ￿nd a way to cooperate and reach e¢ cient
outcomes. But later developments in game theory showed that this assumption
needs justi￿cation. In particular, Nash￿ s non-cooperative solutions to a game, the
Nash equilibria, may be quite ine¢ cient and cooperation may prove bene￿cial to
all players.
The ine¢ ciency of Nash equilibria resulted in several directions of research that
address the discrepancy between the two approaches. The most e⁄ective, perhaps,
is to consider games that are played repeatedly, instead of once. Indeed, the
Folk Theorem of repeated games (see Aumann and Shapley (1976) and Rubinstein
(1979) for early versions and Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) for later versions) states
that when patient players play a one shot game repeatedly, the equilibrium payo⁄s
of the repeated game are precisely all the individually-rational payo⁄s that are in
the convex hull of all the feasible payo⁄s of the one-shot game. Thus all e¢ cient
outcomes are possible in non-cooperative play.
But what about games that are played only once? Several approaches in game
theory address the issue of achieving cooperation in one-shot games.
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A certain degree of cooperation is obtained at correlated equilibria, where the
players of the one-shot game are able to use exogenous correlation devices, see
Aumann (1974, 1987). But while correlated equilibria are more e¢ cient than Nash
equilibria, they still fail to be fully e¢ cient.
Going as far back as the Nash (1953) program, the implementation literature (see
for example Jackson (2001)) has taken a brute force approach to the problem.
1 For
a given game with ine¢ cient equilibria, an implementor is granted the authority
to design a replacement (implementation) game that the players are required to
play. Such carefully-designed implementation games have new equilibria which are
e¢ cient in the original game.
This paper studies cooperation obtained through voluntary conditional com-
mitments that may be made prior to the play of the game. We ￿rst formalize
conditional commitments in a manner that is non-circular and well-de￿ned. We
then show that in a game that allows voluntary commitments full e¢ ciency is pos-
sible under non cooperative Nash equilibria. In parallel to the folk theorem of
repeated games, all feasible individually rational payo⁄s of the one-shot game are
Nash equilibria of the one-shot game that allows voluntary commitments.
1.2. Commitments and conditional commitments. The idea that a player
can improve his outcome in a game through the use of a commitment device goes
back to Schelling (1956 and 1960). For example, when a player in a game delegates
the play to an agent, with irreversible instruction to play strategy X, the agent
may be viewed as a device that commits the player to the strategy X. The strategic
delegation literature, see for example Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Fershtman and
Judd (1987), studies multi-player delegation and shows that one may obtain partial
folk theorems in one-shot games that are played through delegates, see Fershtman,
Judd and Kalai (1991).
Indeed, real players often use agents and other commitment devices strategi-
cally. Sales people representing sellers, lawyers representing buyers, and sports
agents representing athletes are only a few examples. Early price announcements,
in newspapers, on the web and in store windows, are commitments to terms of sale
by retailers. A limited menu of options posted on the web by an airline is a device
that commits the airlines to not discuss certain options that customers may wish
to raise.
But real life examples display the use of more sophisticated, conditional, com-
mitment devices. For example, when placing an ad that states ￿we will sell TVs
of brand X at a price of $500, but will match any competitor￿ s price,￿ a retailer
commits itself to a conditional pricing strategy. Such conditional commitment can
be more e¢ cient. For example, in oligopoly pricing games match-the-competitors
clauses make the monopolist price be a dominant strategy for all sellers, see Kalai
and Satterthwaite (1986) and Salop (1986).
Legal contracts are another example of e⁄ective conditional commitment devices.
Each player￿ s commitment to honor the contract is conditioned on his opponent￿ s
commitment to honor the contract. As Kalai (1981) Kalai and Samet (1985) show,
under dynamic use of contracts, re￿ned Nash equilibria must converge to partially
e¢ cient outcomes.
1This literature addresses a more substantial problem, since it also deals with ine¢ ciencies
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A recent notion of sophisticated conditional delegation is the program equilib-
rium of Tennenholtz (2004). In his model, every player in a game delegates the
choice of his strategy to a computer program. The program he selects reads the
programs selected by his opponents and then outputs a (mixed) strategy that plays
the game on his behalf. The equilibria in the game of choosing programs, called
program equilibria, are more e¢ cient than the unmodi￿ed Nash equilibria of the
game. But they fail to reach full e¢ ciency.
In general, however,conditioning requires caution, as conditional commitments
may fail to uniquely determine the outcome, lead to circular reasoning, or generate
programs that fail to terminate. For example, imagine that each of two retailers
places the following ad in the paper: ￿we sell TVs at a price of $500, but will
undercut any competitor￿ s price by $50.￿ Obviously, no pair of prices charged by
the two competitors is consistent with their ads, because each of the prices should
be $50 lower than the other price, and any dynamic process of changing the prices
in an attempt to abide with the ads will never terminate.
Another example is the prisoners￿dilemma game. If both players commit to
matching the strategy of the opponent then there are two possible outcomes: both
cooperate and both defect. But if one player commits to match and the other
commits to mismatch then there are no possible outcomes consistent with such
commitments.
Indeed, earlier models in game theory and economics, including metagames, see
Howard (1971), and the literature on common agency, see for example Epstein and
Peters (1999)
2, encounter such de￿nitional di¢ culties. In order to deal with the
di¢ culties above, they construct in￿nite hierarchical spaces in which higher levels
of commitments are de￿ned inductively over lower ones.
1.3. Our approach and main ￿nding. The current paper o⁄ers two main contri-
butions. First, it proposes a general model that encompasses the various approaches
and questions above without getting trapped in the de￿nitional di¢ culties of con-
ditional commitments. Second, using this general model it shows that the potential
of conditional commitment devices is essentially unlimited. Since this is a ￿rst at-
tempt at such a model, we restrict the analysis to two-person games with complete
information, avoiding the controversial modelling choices needed in more advanced
settings (see discussion in the concluding section).
In our model a player may delegate her play to a conditioning device that selects
her strategy in the game. To avoid circularities and timing issues, we require that
the device conditions only on the conditioning devices chosen by opponents and
not on the strategies that are ￿nally used in the game. In the TV ad example, we
require every ad to uniquely determine a selling price for every possible ad of the
opponent. In particular, the introduction of a well-de￿ned device space done in the
model below bypasses the need to construct in￿nite hierarchies of commitments.
(This is similar to Harsanyi￿ s (1967) construction of type space that bypassed the
need for in￿nite hierarchies of knowledge).
For a given (arbitrary) two-person strategic game we construct a simple voluntary
universal device space. Being voluntary means, informally, that each individual
player may choose to commit to a device ahead of time, but may also choose not
to commit and just play the game as originally de￿ned. Simplicity assures us that
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the play of the game with commitments is possible, even if the number of possible
commitment devices is large.
The universality of the space means that a full folk theorem is obtained through
play of its (one-shot) induced commitment game. The equilibria of the one-shot
commitment game span the convex hull of all the individually-rational feasible
payo⁄s of the game without commitments. To generate distributions over payo⁄
pro￿les obtained from mixed (as opposed to pure) correlated strategies, the univer-
sal device space uses jointly controlled lotteries, see Blum (1983) and Aumann and
Maschler (1995).
2. A model of commitment devices
In what follows we restrict ourselves to a ￿xed 2-person game, de￿ned by a triple
G ￿ (N = f1;2g;S = S1 ￿ S2;u = (u1;u2) : S ! R2). For simplicity, we assume
that the game is ￿nite.
N = f1;2g is the set of players, each Si is a non-empty set describing the feasible
strategies of player i, and each ui is the payo⁄ function of player i. We use the
standard convention where for every player i, player ￿i denotes the other player.
A mixed strategy of player i is a probability distribution ￿i over Si, with ￿i(si)
describing the probability that player i chooses the strategy si. A pair of inde-
pendent mixed strategies ￿ = (￿1;￿2) induces a probability distribution on S with
￿(s1;s2) = ￿1(s1)￿2(s2). A correlated strategy is a probability distribution ￿ over
S. Clearly, every pair of independent mixed strategies induces the product distri-
bution described above, which is in particular a correlated strategy, but there are
correlated strategies that cannot be obtained this way.
For a correlated strategy ￿ we de￿ne the (expected) payo⁄s in the natural way,
u(￿) = E￿(u).
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium is a pair of strategies s, such that for every
player i, ui(s)(= ui(si;s￿i))￿ ui(si;s￿i), for any alternative strategy si of player i.
A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is a vector of mixed strategies ￿ = (￿1;￿2), with
the same property, i.e., no player can increase his expected payo⁄ by unilaterally
switching to a di⁄erent mixed strategy.
We say that a correlated strategy ￿ is individually rational if for all i 2 N,
ui(￿) ￿ min￿￿i max￿i ui(￿1;￿2). For each player i let  i be some ￿xed member of
argmin￿i(max￿￿i u￿i(￿1;￿2)), to be referred to as his minmax strategy. So when
player i￿ s strategy is  i, then player ￿i￿ s payo⁄ is at most her individual rational
payo⁄.
2.1. Commitment devices and commitment games. In the model below, so-
phisticated players choose their conditioning devices optimally against each other.
For example, for a pair of devices (d￿
1;d￿
2) to be an equilibrium, d￿
1 must be the best
device that player 1 can select against the device d￿
2 of player 2, taking into account
the known responses of d￿
2 to hypothetical alternatives to d￿
1.
Non-empty set Di describes the conditional commitment devices (or just devices)
available to player i. With every device di 2 Di there is an associated device
response function: rdi : D￿i ! Si where rdi(d￿i) denotes the strategy that di
selects for player i, if it plays against the device d￿i of the opponent.
However, to ease the discussion we use a more compact way of representing the
response functions. The responses of the various devices of player i are aggregated
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describes the strategy chosen by the device di of player i when matched against the
device d￿i of the opponent. The two response functions together describe a joint
response function R(d1;d2) = (rd1(d2);rd2(d1)) where R(d1;d2) describe the pair
of strategies selected by the devices when they respond to each other.
Note, however, that any function R: D1 ￿ D2 ! S is a possible joint response
function. This lead to a simple de￿nition of a commitment space.
De￿nition 1 (Device Space). A space of commitment devices (also a device space)
of G is a pair D ￿ (D = D1 ￿ D2;R: D ! S).
Each Di is a none empty set describing the possible devices of player i, and R is
the joint response function. The associated device response functions are de￿ned
(as above) by rdi(d￿i) = Ri(di;d￿i).
A device space D induces a two person commitment game GD (or device game)
in the following natural way. The feasible pure strategies of player i are the devices
in the set Di and the payo⁄ functions are de￿ned by u(d) = (u1(R(d));u2(R(d)))
(we abuse notation by using the letter u to denote both, the payo⁄s in G and the
payo⁄s in GD).
De￿nition 2 (Device Equilibrium). A commitment equilibrium (or device equi-
librium) of the game G is a pair (D;￿), consisting of a device space D and an
equilibrium ￿ of the device game GD.
Clearly, the pair of payo⁄s of any pair of mixed strategies in the device game,
including any device equilibrium, are the payo⁄s of some correlated strategy in G.
Of special interest to us are the equilibrium payo⁄s in voluntary commitment
spaces. These allow each player i to play the game G as scheduled, without making
any advanced commitment. In other words, he can choose any G strategy si 2 Si
without conditioning on the opponent￿ s choices and with the opponent not being
able to condition on si. Formally, we incorporate this into a device space by adding
to it neutral (non committal) devices.
De￿nition 3 (Voluntary). The device space D is voluntary for player i if for every
strategy si 2 Si, his set of devices, Di, contains one designated neutral device sD
i
with the following properties:
(1) For every d￿i 2 D￿i, rsD
i (d￿i) = si, and
(2) For every d￿i 2 D￿i; and si;si 2 Si, rd￿i(sD
i ) = rd￿i(sD
i ):
A voluntary device space is one that is voluntary for both players.
3. Elaboration on the model.
A trivial example of voluntary commitment space is with each Di = Si , where
GD = G. But all the examples discussed in the introduction, delegation to agents,
newspaper ads, contracts, program equilibrium, etc., and many more can be e⁄ec-
tively described by the model above. The next example illustrates this point.
Example 1 (Price competition). Consider two retailers, 1 and 2, preparing to
compete in the sales of TVs of brand X in the upcoming weekend. The game G is
described by the (per-unit) prices that each retailer may charge, and the payo⁄ of
each retailer is the pro￿t realized after informed buyers choose who to buy from.
Assume, for simplicity, that there is a known demand curve, that buyers buy from
the less expensive retailer, and that if their prices are the same, the demand is
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As discussed in the introduction, this game lends itself to the use of commitment
devices in the form of newspaper ads posted in Friday￿ s newspaper. To ￿t into the
formal model above, we may let D1 and D2 describe (respectively) all the ads that
the two retailers are allowed to post. With the Di￿ s speci￿ed, it is straightforward
to verify that ads lead to well-de￿ned prices: one must check that for every ad of
player i, di, there is a well de￿ne price of retailer i, rdi(d￿i), resulting from every
competitor￿ s ad, d￿i 2 D￿i. This formulation disallows vague ads, like "I will
undercut opponents￿prices by $50," which fail to specify a response price to an
identical competitor￿ s ad.
Notice that in parallel to the above mathematical need for coherent responses,
there is a legal real-life need for coherence. This could be accomplished through
a variety of restrictions. For example, the paper may insist that an ad consist of
two items, a posted price, p, and a rule, h, that responds to posted (not computed)
prices of the opponent. In this case, the device set of player i consists of all such
pairs (pi;hi), and if retailers 1 and 2 place the ads d1 = (p1;h1) and d2 = (p2;h2)
then the selling prices are R(d1;d2) = (h1(p2);h2(p1)).
3.1. More e⁄ective model. Earlier attempts to deal with sophisticated condi-
tional commitments (without the use of well de￿ned commitment device spaces)
lead to di¢ cult models. Howard (1971) wanted to describe a notion of a meta
strategy, one that conditions its choice of an action based on the action chosen by
the opponent. For example, a player in a one shot prisoners￿dilemma game should
be able to match-the-opponent, and in e⁄ect induce a tit-for-tat strategy in the one
shot game.
But this plan proved to be di¢ cult due to the issue of timing. How can a player
react to his opponent￿ s choice, if they play simultaneously?
Howard￿ s solution was to construct an in￿nite hierarchical structure of reaction
rules: At the lowest level each player chooses a strategy in the underlying game,
and at level t + 1 he speci￿es response rules to his opponent level t rules.3
But hierarchical structures have not proven useful in dealing with applications,
and the space of commitment devices used in this paper bypasses the need for such
complex structures. This is similar to Harsanyi￿ s (1967) use of a space of types
that bypasses the need for a complete hierarchical structure of knowledge about
knowledge a la Mertens and Zamir (1985).4
The following example may help in illustrating this point.
Example 2 (Divorce-settlement). This game is a simple model of divorce between
two players, he and she. The underlying game is exactly like the standard Prisoners￿
Dilemma game with cooperative (c) and aggressive (a) strategies.
But assume now that each player has the option of choosing a lawyer to represent
him in the game and that lawyers are of two possible types: ￿exible (fl) and tough
(tl) (and lawyers know the types of other lawyers).
No matter who they face, tl￿ s choose the strategy a. But fl￿ s choose the strategy c
when they face an opponent of type fl, and choose the strategy a against all others.
3Similar issues are addressed in the economic literature on common agencies , see for example
Epstein and Peters (1999), where each ￿rm is allowed to condition its strategies on the strategies
chosen simultaneously by its rival ￿rms.
4Unlike Harsanyi￿ s model that superseded the hierarchical structure of Mertens and Zamir,
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The lawyers ￿t the description of commitment devices in the model above, and
the table below describes the game in which players have the choice of delegating
the play to a lawyer or playing on their own using the (non committal) neutral
devices, cd; or ad.
Notice that the restrictions made on neutral devices are satis￿ed. For example,
when Player 1 "delegates" to cd, regardless of what device is used by the opponent,
Player 1 ends up with the action c. Moreover, the devices of Player 2, in choosing
an action for Player 2, never di⁄erentiate between the devices cd and ad of Player
1 (the second entries in the two bottom cells of every column are identical).
If one substitutes the prisoners￿dilemma payo⁄s in the sixteen cells in the table
(assuming that the lawyers fees are negligible :), it is easy to see that fl,fl is a
dominant strategy equilibrium. In e⁄ect, this equilibrium employs a tit-for-tat type
of strategy to get cooperation in this one shot prisoners￿dilemma game: a player
deviating from fl causes the opponent￿ s device to switch from c to a.
Pl 2
fl tl cd ad
fl c,c a,a a,c a,a
Pl 1 tl a,a a,a a,c a,a
cd c,a c,a c,c c,a
ad a,a a,a a,c a,a
4. A folk theorem in a universal device space
In the Divorce Settlement Example above, it is easy to generate cooperation
through the use of commitment devices. But this task is more di¢ cult in examples
of the following type.
Example 3. (2-person Cournot entry game)
Pl 2
in out
Pl 1 in 1, 1 10,0
out 0,10 0 ,0
Here, the minmax strategy for both players guarantees each player a payo⁄ of
at least 1. But unlike in the prisoners￿dilemma game, there is no pair of pure
strategies that simultaneously yield each player a payo⁄s greater than 1. Yet a full
folk theorem should attain every payo⁄ in the convex hull of f(1;1);(1;9);(9;1)g,
for example (5;5), as an equilibrium payo⁄.
In the repeated-game folk theorem, this is not a problem since the players can
alternate in playing the cells (in;out) and (out;in), and a trigger strategy will
induce the correct incentives to do so. But such alteration is impossible if the game
is played only once.
As it turns out, however, such alterations may be replaced by jointly controlled
lotteries, a la Blum (1983) and Aumann and Maschler (1995). The folk theorem
below illustrates how this can be done with the appropriate incentives.
Theorem 1 (Commitment-device folk-theorem). For the two player game G, there
exists a voluntary commitment device space U = (U;L) with a commitment game GU
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game G can be obtained as a (mixed strategy) Nash equilibrium of the commitment
game GU.
Proof. We ￿rst construct U. The game will have in￿nite sets of strategies. The
strategies of a player are a triple, where the ￿rst part is an encoding of a correlated
strategy, the second part is a number in the interval [0;1], and the third part is a
fall-back strategy in Si. Let M = jSj and let [M] denote f1;2;:::;Mg.
We now describe a method for encoding any correlated strategy ￿ over S by a
unique x 2 ￿M = fx 2 [0;1]Mj
P
i xi = 1g, the simplex of dimension M ￿ 1. The
important property is that there is a function f : ￿M ￿ [0;1] ! S such that the
probability that f(x;r) = s for a uniformly random r 2 [0;1] is the same as the
probability assigned to s by ￿. (There are several ways to achieve this, and any
other method of achieving it would be satisfactory.) For completeness, we give one
such encoding now. Any x 2 ￿M corresponds to a probability distribution over [M]





￿ x1 + x2 + ::: + xj ￿ r
￿
:
Finally, let ￿ : [M] ! S denote an arbitrary bijection from [M] to S. The map ￿
should be ￿xed and known in advance to all players. Hence, ￿M gives a unique
encoding of correlated strategies over S, where the correlated strategy correspond-
ing to x 2 ￿M is chosen by picking r uniformly at random from [0;1] and taking
f(x;r) = ￿(g(x;r)).
We can now specify U = (U;L). U = (￿M [ f?g) ￿ [0;1] ￿ Si. The special
symbol ? is necessary to make the game voluntary, and indicates that the player







f(x1;r1 + r2 ￿ br1 + r2c) if x1 = x2 and x1 6= ?
(s1;s2) otherwise
The expression r1 + r2 ￿ br1 + r2c above computes the fractional part of r1 + r2.
Now let ￿ be an individually rational correlated strategy of G. We will see that
there is a mixed device equilibrium of U with an outcome distribution that coincides
with the correlated strategy ￿. Let x be the unique encoding of ￿ so that, for any
s 2 S, the probability that f(x;r) = s is equal to the probability that ￿ assigns
to s. Take the mixed device for each player ￿i that chooses (xi;ri;si) by taking
xi = x (with probability 1), ri 2 [0;1] uniformly at random and, independently, si
according to the mixed minmax strategy of player i.
To see that ￿ = (￿1;￿2) has the desired properties, notice ￿rst that for any ri
chosen by player i, the equilibrium strategy of the opponent induces the distribu-
tion ￿ on S. In other words, player i cannot gain by deviating from the uniform
distribution on his ri￿ s. Moreover, deviating by submitting a vector x0
i 6= x, makes
him face the minmax distribution of his opponent, which can only decrease his
payo⁄.
The game is voluntary because player i has neutral strategy (?;0;si) for any
strategy si 2 Si. ￿
4.1. Finite number of devices. The above commitment space is in￿nite. It is
important to note that a ￿nite version approximation of the above folk theorem can
be made where correlated strategies have coe¢ cients that are integer multiples of







. While this does not give a full-folk theorem, it is su¢ cient
for many practical purposes and has the advantages of being ￿nite.
Theorem 2 (Finite commitment-device folk-theorem). For the two player game G
and any n ￿ 1, there exists a ￿nite voluntary commitment device space Un =
(Un;Ln) with a commitment game GU
n that has the following property. Every





can be obtained as a (mixed strategy) Nash equilibrium of the com-
mitment game GU
n. Moreover, the function Ln can be computed in time polynomial
in log(n).
The proof of the above theorem is nearly the same as that of Theorem 1. The
only di⁄erence is that the correlated strategies (and simplex) are discretized to an






Such numbers are represented using O(logn) bits. The function Ln is straightfor-
ward to e¢ ciently compute, i.e., compute in time polynomial in the input length.
In some applications, a ￿nite number of commitment devices may be su¢ cient
to achieve a full folk theorem. It may be useful to know, however, that for the folk
theorem with the generality above (one universal commitment space that achieves
all equilibria of the game G) one needs in￿nitely many devices, unless the game is
of a very narrow form. The following is a sketch of such a theorem and its proof.
Theorem 3. For any two player game G the following two conditions are equiva-
lent:
1. There exists a ￿nite device space U in which every individually rational cor-
related strategy in G can be obtained as a Nash equilibrium of GU,
2.The feasible payo⁄s set of G is a rectangle with facets parallel to the axes.
Proof. If (2) holds, then there are four payo⁄s in the game which are the extreme
points of the feasible set. Thus, one can de￿ne a 2 ￿ 2 device game in which each
player controls the payo⁄ of the other and has no say over her own payo⁄. The
equilibrium payo⁄s in this game are the entire feasible set of G.
As for the converse, assume (1) and that (contrary to (2)) one the facets of G￿ s
payo⁄s, say F, is not parallel to one of the axes. Since F is a facet of the feasible
set, in order to obtain a (correlated) payo⁄ in F, all the payo⁄s involved should be
also in F.
Let ￿ = (￿1;￿2) be any equilibrium of GU whose payo⁄ is in F and let U￿ = (
D￿
1 ￿D￿
2;T) where each D￿
i denotes the supports of ￿i. The payo⁄s of GU
￿
are all
in F. Moreover, ￿ induces a full-support equilibrium of GU
￿
.
Consider any subspace U0 = (D0
1 ￿D0
2;T) of U where all payo⁄s of GU
0
are in F.
By a linear transformation of the payo⁄s of player 1, GU
0
can be transformed to a
zero-sum game, say GU
0
0 . As a zero-sum game GU
0
0 has only one equilibrium payo⁄.
In particular, all full-support equilibria of GU
0
0 induce the same payo⁄.
Since GU
0
0 is derived from GU
0
by a linear transformation (of the payo⁄s of one
of the players), any full-support equilibrium of GU
0
0 is a full-support equilibrium
of GU
0
. Consequently, any GU
0
has only one full-support equilibrium payo⁄. Since
there are ￿nitely many subgames GU
0
in GU with payo⁄s in F, and each has at most
one full-support equilibrium payo⁄, there are only ￿nitely many equilibrium payo⁄s
of GU in F. Thus, the equilibrium payo⁄s of GU cannot cover all the correlated
equilibrium strategies payo⁄s in F. This contradiction leads to the conclusion that10 ADAM TAUMAN KALAI, EHUD KALAI, EHUD LEHRER, AND DOV SAMET
if GU is ￿nite, then all the facets of the feasible set of U are parallel to the axes.
￿
4.2. Contrasts between commitment and correlated equilibria. The notion
of a commitment device, introduced here, is di⁄erent from Aumann￿ s (1974, 1987)
notion of correlation device in some important ways. Given a strategic game G,
a correlation device outputs, prior to the start of the game, a vector of individual
private messages generated by a commonly known probability distribution. The
players proceed to play G after learning their private messages. Once a player re-
ceived a signal he has no way to a⁄ect the distribution over other players￿strategies.
To generate a correlated equilibrium one needs an external impartial mediator,
or, alternatively, use a system of devices that produces signaling that induce the
desired correlated distribution over the game outcome (see, Barany (1992), Lehrer
(1996), Lehrer and Sorin (1997), Ben-Porath (1998), Gossner (1998), and Urbano
and Vila (2002)).
In a commitment space, on the other hand, there is only common knowledge of
the individual devices that the players may use. Players may delegate the play to
their devices prior to the start of the game. In a commitment equilibrium there
is a commonly known probability distribution over commitments, which in turn
induces commonly known probability distribution over outcomes. However, by
changing commitments a player may change the probability distribution over other
players￿strategies (in the original game).
As it turns out, the set of commitment equilibrium payo⁄s is signi￿cantly larger
than that of correlated equilibrium. In the Cournot Entry game above the only
correlated equilibrium is for both players to choose in, with the payo⁄s (1;1).
But as the folk theorem above illustrates any pair of payo⁄s in the convex hull of
f(1;1);(1;9);(9;1)g, including (5;5), can be obtained at a commitment equilibrium.
4.3. Contrasts between commitment and program equilibrium. Tennen-
holtz (2004) presents a partial folk theorem using program equilibria: The program
equilibrium payo⁄s of a game G consist of all the individually-rational payo⁄ pairs
that can be obtained through independent (not correlated) mixes strategies of G.
Applying the result of Tennenholtz to the Cournot entry game above the largest
symmetric program-equilibrium payo⁄s are (27
9;27
9), short of the e¢ cient payo⁄s
(5;5) that can be obtained at a commitment equilibrium.
Tennenholtz￿ s programs may be viewed as commitment devices, but there are
important di⁄erences between the formal models. A commitment device, as de￿ned
in this paper, outputs a pure strategy for a player. A program, in Tennenholtz￿ s
model, outputs a mixed strategy for a player. Thus, Tennenholtz￿ s programs o⁄er
more ￿ exibility then our commitment devices.
Given this added ￿ exibility, one would expect Tennenholtz to get a larger, rather
than the obtained smaller, set of equilibrium payo⁄s. But there is another important
di⁄erence. Tennenholtz￿ s analysis is restricted to the payo⁄s obtained through the
use of pure-strategy program equilibria, while our model allows for mixed-strategy
commitment equilibria.
It may be tempting to work within Tennenholtz￿ s model, and to study the set
of mixed-strategy program-equilibrium payo⁄s. But then, as our model shows, one
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5. Additional remarks
To avoid controversial modeling choices, the discussion above was restricted to
a simple model rich enough for meaningful positive results. But there are several
important directions to investigate.
5.1. Extensions to n-players. When dealing with more than two players, repeated-
game folk theorems bring about some modeling choices. For example, if player i
deviates from the equilibrium, can the remaining players secretly correlate their
future strategies in order to achieve a more e⁄ective punishment against him? Dif-
ferent answers to the above question lead to di⁄erent possible equilibrium sets.
Similar related choices must be faced when dealing with commitment devices of
more than 2 players. For example, in the two player case above we assume that
every player￿ s device can condition on (e.g., see) the device used by his opponent.
When we deal with more players, are all devices fully visible to all the players￿
devices, or should we allow each coalition to have devices that are only visible to
the devices of its own members?
What equilibrium payo⁄s can be obtained under a various visibility assumptions?
Can the results of Aumann (1961) on Alpha and Beta cores in repeated games be
reproduced in one shot games with devices?
5.2. Commitment in Bayesian games. Restricting ourselves to complete in-
formation games, the folk theorem above shows that strategic ine¢ ciencies may
be removed by commitments. The following example shows that one may expect
similar improvements with regards to informational ine¢ ciencies.
Example 4 (Hunting a hidden stag). Consider two players, 1 and 2, and three
locations, H1;H2, and H3. A prize is located at random in one of the three lo-
cations (with probability 1=3 for each), and each player i , who is initially located
at Hi , is told whether the prize is at his location, or not. Following this, in one
simultaneous move, each player chooses one of the three locations. If both players
choose the location with the prize they are paid $1 each, otherwise zero. Assuming
no communication, the highest achievable equilibrium payo⁄ is 2=3 each.
When dealing with commitments in Bayesian games, there are several modeling
choices. For example, are the individual commitments done before or after the
private information is revealed. Assuming the latter, the example above illustrates
that commitments may be used as means for e¢ cient communication.
Consider a commitment space in which each player i has two devices, si (for
stubborn) and fi (for ￿ exible). The device si chooses the location Hi no matter
what device is used by the opponent. The device fi chooses the location H￿i
against the device s￿i of the opponent, but chooses H3 against the device f￿i of
the opponent. Consider the strategy pro￿le where each player i chooses si when the
prize is at his location and fi otherwise. It is easy to see that this is an equilibrium
that guarantees that they both show up at the right place, whichever one it is.
5.3. Uncertain, partial, and dynamic commitment. What can be achieved
by devices that are not fully observable? This issue was partially studied in the
delegation literature. For example, Katz and Shapiro (1985) argued that unob-
served delegation could not really change the equilibrium of a game. On the other
hand Fershtman and Kalai (1997) have shown that under restriction to perfect Nash
equilibrium, even unobserved delegation may drastically a⁄ect payo⁄s.12 ADAM TAUMAN KALAI, EHUD KALAI, EHUD LEHRER, AND DOV SAMET
Another important direction is partial commitments. What if the commitment
devices do not fully determine the strategies of their owners, but only restrict the
play to subsets of strategies, to be completed in subsequent play by the real players?
It seems that a fully developed model of commitments should allow for the
options above and more. It should be dynamic, with gradually increasing levels of
commitments that are only partially observable.
5.4. Commitment and Implementation. There are some important di⁄erences
between these two areas. In much of the implementation literature, an outsider is
in charge of constructing the alternative game to be played. In this paper, we think
of the players as volunteering to make their own individual commitments. But our
model of commitments lends itself to other interpretations.
In this regard, it is useful to note that the device space constructed in the folk
theorem above does not require any knowledge of the players￿payo⁄s, but only
knowledge of their feasible strategies. This means that the construction of the
device space may be accomplished by an uninformed implementor, as is the case in
many models of the implementation literature.
5.5. Commitment devices for self control. Commitments against one￿ s future
self were studied in Ferreira, Maschler and Gilboa (1995). What is the best thing
to do now, if I know that my future actions will be dictated by new preferences
that contradict my current ones (I don￿ t want and don￿ t plan to eat the peanuts in
tonight￿ s party, but I know that I will once I am there)? In the current paper, players
conditioned their choices on the choices of opponents. But a special interesting case,
in a dynamic commitment model, would allow conditioning on a player￿ s own future
selves.
5.6. Coordination, contracts, and cryptography. The commitments we have
described are di⁄erent than contracts in the sense that both sides make their own
commitments. Thus less communication is required than in designing a contract,
where both sides must agree on the same document. As we have shown, it is
possible to achieve a folk theorem without agreeing upon a contract. However,
our construction requires substantial coordination in order to achieve anything but
minmax play.5
Finally, an alternative would be to achieve coordination using cryptography and
contracts. Players could describe a single correlated strategy in the contract and
agree to play it based upon a joint lottery (Blum, 1983; Aumann and Maschler,
1995). The random numbers required for the joint lottery could be securely en-
coded within the contract using a computational commitment device, see, e.g.,
Naor (1991). For example, a player can commit to a random bit b 2 f0;1g by writ-
ing down a number n which is either the product of two (b = 0) or three (b = 1)
large prime numbers. Since it is believed that counting the number of factors of a
large number is computationally hard, their choices remain essentially secret until
the factorization is revealed. (This can be repeated to commit to as many bits as
5Alternative schemes could allow plays to quickly commit to play a ￿default￿correlated strat-
egy, where the default would presumably be an individually rational correlated strategy that
maximizes some quantity (e.g., sum of payo⁄s). In order to play this strategy, they would sim-
ply need to commit to it and submit a single random number, rather than explicitly stating the
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necessary.) Finally, after the contract is signed, both parties reveal the factoriza-
tions of their numbers and the play will be determined and legally enforceable.
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